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Abstract
Issues of fairness within the agency framework have traditionally
been investigated { both theoretically and experimentally { within two
alternative approaches: a \vertical", hierarchical framework (studies of
fairness in the agency relationship between one principal and one sin-
gle agent) and a \horizontal", agent{to{agent framework (studies of
reciprocity in peers' interactions under alternative incentive schemes).
We explore in the laboratory a game which integrates vertical and hor-
izontal relationships and allows to investigate how principal's fairness
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aects cooperation between two interdependent agents performing a
simple production game. We set a 2{stage game where, in the second
stage, agents play a prisoner's dilemma game and, in the rst stage,
the principal can withdraw any share of the output generated by the
agents in the second stage. Despite theory predicting that no fairness
should be observed by the principal and no cooperation should be ob-
served by agents, our experimental ndings show that agents are to
some extent sensitive to principal's fairness. When the principal plays
unfair (fair) agents are frequently observed to jointly defect (cooper-
ate). Thus, fairness considerations on principal's actions may act as a
coordination device for the agents and reciprocal behavior may, as a
result, aect their propensity towards cooperation or defection in the
game.
JEL Classication: C72, C92.
Keywords: Principal{agent theory, Prisoner's Dilemma, Team production,
Reciprocity, Fairness, Experimental economics.
1 Introduction
Since our early school days (not to speak about family life), we have to
learn the subtleties and complexities of reciprocity, fairness and envy in
hierarchical relationships. Is it fair to share precious knowledge with your
lazy school mate during a written test? Is the teacher fair in giving the
same bad marks to the copying and the copied student? How to behave
during next test? Despite the obvious (and painful) behavioral relevance of
such questions, issues of fairness in hierarchical contexts have been
empirically addressed only in recent years, mostly in a framework of
agency relationships and contract design. A growing body of research in
experimental economics has investigated the behavioral consequences of
alternative types of incentive schemes on workers productivity (e.g.: group
versus individual schemes, absolute versus relative evaluation methods),
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the eectiveness of economic and non economic contract enforcement
devices on work eort levels, or the impact of incentives on the
intertemporal behavior and the risk attitude of decision makers.
1
Much of the evidence gathered in the laboratory on these and related
issues has shown that the behavior of subjects in agency relationships is
signicantly aected by relative and distributive concerns (how to share a
rent, how to divide a common outcome). Subjects seem to take into
account the way other players behave and perform systematic comparisons
of the payos earned by others. Their concern for fairness results in \fair
play" and reciprocal behavior (costly punishment of others' unfair
behavior and costly reward of others' fair behavior).
Virtually all of these studies have focused on the emergence of
reciprocating behavior in two basic dyadic relational schemes:
 reciprocity within the vertical agency relationship between a principal
and a single agent. These studies investigate, under various
conditions, the existence of reciprocal norms inuencing the agency
relationship between a principal and one single agent;
 reciprocity within the horizontal agent{agent relationship under
alternative compensation schemes. These studies highlight that in
team compensation and peer-to-peer working relationships relative
payo considerations may be of crucial im portance in aecting job
performances (consider, for instance, the impact of relative
evaluation or group incentive schemes, or the eect of information
about peers compensation on job performance).
These two streams of research have been, so far, investigated
independently. However, in many contexts of empirical relevance {
especially in organizations { \vertical" relationships between a principal
and an agent are intertwined with \horizontal" relations within the same
hierarchical level. Nevertheless, very little research has jointly addressed
1
For a comprehensive survey of experimental research on these topics we point the
reader to existing surveys on these topics [Gachter and Fehr, 1999, Rossi, 1999].
3
Alessandro Rossi and Massimo Warglien
these two dimensions of interaction. Not only is empirical research on
\triangular" principal-agent relationships substantially absent. Theory is
missing as well. To our knowledge, only a few theoretical studies
[Mookherjee, 1984, Itoh, 1994] have developed the principal{agent
framework in a multi{agent setting. Triangular features are similarly
overlooked by economic theories of reciprocity.
2
This paper may be regarded as an exploratory attempt to blend the
vertical and the horizontal agency relations in a laboratory setting in order
to analyze the emergence of "triangular" reciprocity. In particular, we
explore whether and to what extent a principal's fairness aects
cooperation between interdependent agents performing a simple
production task.
In order to make it easier to interpret the experimental results, we have
kept the experimental scheme as simple and familiar as possible. Basically,
the experiment consists in a two-stage game in which in the rst stage a
principal decides which share of the pie generated by his/her agents he/she
will keep for him/herself and which share will correspondingly be
distributed to the agents; in the second stage, agents generate the pie by
playing a production game in which the relative payos of the agents have
a Prisoner's Dilemma structure, but their absolute value is determined by
the unilateral choice of the principal in stage 1. Actually, one may
synthetically think of it as a prisoner's dilemma embedded in a dictator
game. Not surprisingly, we nd that the principal-dictator's fairness
strongly aects agents' behavior. Generous principals foster mutual
cooperation between agents, while greedy ones induce more joint defection.
The paper is organized as follows: next section summarizes the main
experimental literature on fairness in agency relationships and contract
design. Section 3 introduces our experiment. Section 4 presents the main
experimental results. Further developments of our research are shortly
discussed in Section 5.
2
By the way, see a short discussion in the concluding section of Rabin [1993].
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2 Previous studies
Recalling the classication introduced in the previous section, in the
following we will briey review the evidence gathered on the \vertical"
dimension of fairness in the experimental literature on agency, and then we
will turn to the \horizontal" dimension reviewing some experiments in
team and contract theory.
Reciprocity within the vertical agency relationship between a principal and
a single agent. Fehr, jointly with other scholars [Fehr et al., 1993, 1998b,
Fehr and Falk, forthcoming, Fehr et al., 1998a, Fehr and Tougareva, 1995]
has conducted experiments based on the so{called \Gift Exchange Game",
that is, a two{stage game similar to a sequential social dilemma, which can
be summarized as follows: the rst{stage is a wage determination game in
which workers (agents) and rms (principals) trade for stipulating job
contracts with each other (according to a particular labor market
structure); in the second{stage, workers who have successfully concluded a
contract with a rm must choose an eort level. Theoretical predictions
suggest that workers should exhibit minimal eort levels (because eorts
above that level are increasingly costly) no matter the wage they receive.
Since rms are aware of this, they should respond by paying the
competitive (zero rent) wage corresponding to the minimum eort level.
Experimental ndings, however, show that average wages are substantially
above the competitive wage corresponding to the minimum eort level,
and eort levels are higher than the minimum level. Moreover, workers's
wages contain substantial amounts of rent (wages are much higher than
the competitive wage corresponding to the workers' observed eort levels).
These results seem to suggest that principals actually do take into account
fairness motives when oering a contract to agents, and that agents react
to fair wages showing working eorts higher than the minimum level.
Further studies have then investigated to what extent the reciprocal
attitude of principals and agents may be able to mitigate the contract
enforcement problem [Fehr and Gachter, 1998, Fehr et al., 1997]. This
problem is typical of agency relationships because many employment
contracts are incomplete and workers have some eort discretion; thus,
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whenever rms have limited enforcement technology and deal with rational
and purely selsh workers, they are unable to enforce the ecient eort
level, and can only achieve a minimal eort level (below the ecient one).
On the other hand, if one assumes that principals and agents may be
inuenced by reciprocal concerns, their behavior may result in an outcome
of the contract enforcement game dierent from Nash equilibrium. As a
matter of fact, behavioral evidence conrms that reciprocal motives within
the agency relationship may be regarded as a successful device in raising
eort levels above the minimum [Fehr and Gachter, 1998], and that
reciprocity alone may be more eective than many traditional contract
enforcement devices such as incentive contracting, nes and monitoring
[Fehr et al., 1997].
Two additional experimental studies are worth to mention. Keser and
Willinger [forthcoming] implemented in the laboratory a standard
textbook principal{agent game with hidden action. In this setting, the
principal states a contract that species the agent's wage contingent to the
observed ex{post prots and the agent has to decide whether to accept or
decline the contract. In case of acceptance, then, he/she has to decide
whether to perform a high level of eort or a low one (less expensive). The
agent's chosen eort level aects the magnitude of the expected prots of
the principal. The simplicity of this setting allows the authors to contrast
clearly theoretical predictions to experimental ndings. On the one hand,
theoretical analysis have traditionally almost neglected the strategic nature
of the game and, as a result, the problem has commonly been treated as an
individual maximization problem for the principal, where the agent's
behavior is taken into account introducing two constraints: the (i)
participation constraint and the (ii) incentive compatibility constraint.
These constraints assure, respectively, that (i) the wage schedule oered to
the agent is chosen so that the expected wage is at least not lower than the
side option in the labor market and that (ii) the expected wage, given that
the agent performs the action that maximizes the expected wealth of the
principal, is at least not lower than the expected wage in the case when
he/she performs any other available action. As a result, at the equilibrium
6
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the principal oers to the agent a contract that makes him/her indierent
in participating to the rm or not, and, in case of participation, to act in
the interest of the principal or not. In other words, theory assumes that
the agent joins the rm and performs in the best interest of the principal
in a setting in which the former has no sensible gain at all in choosing so,
while the latter is the only one to benet of all the additional prots.
Experimental evidence tells a dierent story: principal oers are far from
the theoretical levels and are much more fair. In this regard, principals
seem to clearly understand the ultimatum{nature of the game and avoid
oers too unfair, because they may be rejected by agents.
Finally, Anderhub et al. [1999] investigate a similarly simple
principal{agent game with no hidden action and deterministic prots
function where the agent's contract consists in a xed component (base
pay) and a return share on rm's prots. They show that agents tend to
reject unfair contracts and that fair contracts are reciprocated (eorts level
are higher than the optimal ones conditional to the accepted contract).
Reciprocity within the horizontal agent{agent relationship under alternative
compensation schemes. While no experimental study on team
compensation, to our knowledge, have explicitly focused on the issue of
fairness, it is still possible to interpret some results of this body of research
as an evidence that subjects' behavior in this setting is aected by
distributive concerns. Team literature has both theoretically and
experimentally shown that free{riding may be the outcome of many team
work interactions. This is clearly the case when the so{called egalitarian
revenue sharing rule is introduced. That is, a group incentive mechanism,
parallel to the voluntary mechanism in the public good literature, that
assigns to each participant of the group the same share of the produced
outcome, regardless of the individual contributions. Experimental evidence
shows that overtime people tend to lower their contribution to the group
outcome and to shirk, behaving according to the dominant strategy of the
game.
Some contributions have suggested modications in the incentive
mechanism so minimize the de{motivation induced by the egalitarian
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sharing. For instance, Holmstrom [1982] has devised a forcing contract
mechanism, a simple modication of the sharing rule that makes the
distribution of the produced outcome among the team workers contingent
upon the fulllment of a production target and that prevents agents from
free{ride. Nalbantian and Schotter [1997] proved evidence that
theoretically equivalent incentive compatible devices are not equivalent in
the laboratory and did clearly show that, while competitive incentives
largely enhances productivity, other incentive compatible mechanism are
ineective in avoiding free{riding.
But free{riding may be lessened in other ways: some studies have
explicitly investigated the role of peer pressure and direct control from
coworkers as a determinant of motivation in team workgroup (see, for
instance, Kandel and Lazear [1992] and Plott and Casari [1999] for an
experiment in a common pool setting).
Moreover, the fact that subjects in a team work setting do care about the
relative distribution of earnings within the participants pool is reected by
some studies. For instance, Croson [1999] shows that introducing feedback
on eort levels of other participants in a team may result in imitation
dynamics where participants converge towards the same contribution level
(and where everyone earns the same payo). In comparison with a control
treatment that had no such feedback, groups in the information treatment
had similar eort levels on average but much more higher variance. This
higher variance was due to high between{group variance and low
within{group variance. That is, some teams coordinated into high levels of
eort (cooperating) while other teams locked into low levels (shirking).
Hence, the simple introduction of feedback on eort chosen by other
participants in the group change dramatically the outcome of the game. A
possible interpretation of this dierence may be that the introduction of
feedback makes other subject's behavior and earnings more transparent
than in the control treatment, where one can just make inferences on
others' behavior based on the total group contribution. In this treatment,
then, convergence towards a common contribution level (cooperation or
free-riding) is fostered by a dynamical process of adjustment of individual
8
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contributions based on easy comparisons of how other individuals are
behaving and how much they are earning.
Other studies put in evidence that reciprocal behavior may be elicited by
the degree of saliency of eort levels. Real task experiments within the
standard egalitarian revenue sharing rule, have proved to elicit behavioral
responses somehow dierent from standard experiments with simulated
task. When the task environment is modeled so that people perform a real
production task, subjects seem to feel obliged to reciprocate to high levels
of contribution of other teammates and free riding is not the typical
outcome of the experiment [London and Oldham, 1977, van Dijk et al.,
1998].
Finally, in some asymmetric settings, where some subjects benet of some
advantages relative to others, disadvantaged subjects may be more focused
in acting so that advantaged subjects do not earn considerably more than
themselves, regardless of maximizing their individual expected payo. This
is the case of many bargaining situations (such as the ultimatum game,
where responders decline unfair oers even if this result in losses for them)
and in contract theory this is the case of some experiments on
tournaments. Bull et al. [1987], for instance, examined the behavior of
experimental subjects of 2{person rank{order asymmetric tournaments.
3
Theoretical analysis predicts that, in equilibrium, the eort level of one
contestant should be inversely proportional to his/her cost eort and, as a
consequence, the advantaged contestant should have a larger probability to
win the prize because of its favorable cost schedule. The authors, on the
other hand, proved evidence that disadvantaged subjects may show eort
levels systematically higher than equilibrium predictions, the reason being
in perceiving the setting as unfair and exploited by the other participant.
As a result they may act as if they were concerned to \steal" the prize of
the tournament to the advantaged contestant, although the expected
payo for the disadvantaged subject, in doing so, is much lower than at the
3
These are tournaments in which participants show dierent skills or attitudes towards
eort. The player with a higher (lower) eort cost than another is called the \disadvan-
taged" (advantaged) player.
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equilibrium, due to his/her high costs of eort.
3 A Prisoner Dilemma with a dictator
3.1 The model
Consider this simple production setting with one principal and two agents:
the two agents are involved in a simple production task where each of
them has to decide on the allocation of his/her working eort. More
precisely, each agent has to decide whether he/she is going to help (or
collaborate with) the other agent or not. The decision of one agent aects
both his/her production level and the one corresponding to the other
agent: while helping eorts of one agent increase the other's production
level, on the other side they decrease the agent's own production amount.
Moreover, if both the agents decide to provide help, they are both better
o (with respect to their production levels) but, regardless of what the
other agent is going to do (provide help or not), the production level for
one agent is always higher when he/she is not providing help because
he/she can concentrate more eort on his/her own production task.
Produced units are placed in a market with excess demand by the rm
owner, the principal. Without loss of generality we can assume that each
produced unit is worth 1 experimental currency unit for the principal.
He/she is the residual claimant of the value of units produced by the two
agents. Agents' remuneration for the production is governed by a simple
piece rate rule, whose rate per unit is identical for the two agents and is
decided by the principal.
Agents cannot decide to terminate the contract with the rm (this means
that no side market option in introduced in the model and the
participation of workers in the rm is not investigated here).
The described production task is modeled as a two{stage game, that runs
as follows: in the rst stage the principal publicly announces which share
1  (W=100) of the output value (that has to be produced in the second
stage by the two agents) is to be attributed to him/herself as his/her own
10
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payo in the round. Alternatively, one can interpret W=100 as the piece
rate, the per unit remuneration assigned to agents by the principal.
4
The
domain for W is any integer number between 1 and 100. The decision of
the principal is binding to the agents. In the second stage, then, each
agent has to decide between two alternative strategies (A and B) that
result in dierent individual output values, as shown in Figure 1.
(q
1
; q
2
) A B
A 60; 60 10; 70
B 70; 10 20; 20
Figure 1: The rm production function: relationship between agents'
decisions and agents' individual output levels.
This structure of output may be thought as the simplest way to model
task interdependency of two agents in a production setting: if they both
choose to cooperate or help each other (strategy A) they are both better
o, while defection or restraining from helping eorts towards the other
agent (strategy B) is the dominant strategy (for an agent concerned in
maximizing his/her own production level).
Hence, the agents' relative payo structure in the game clearly recall a
prisoner's dilemma game where absolute payos depend on W as depicted
in Figure 2.
Payo(A
1
), Payo(A
2
) A B
A (W=100)60; (W=100)60 (W=100)10; (W=100)70
B (W=100)70; (W=100)10 (W=100)20; (W=100)20
Figure 2: Agents' payo conditional to piece rate W and agents' behavior.
Finally, the principal's payo, depending on the agents' strategies, is
determined as in Figure 3.
Using a standard backward induction argument it is clear that, whatever
the principal decides in the rst stage of the game, in the second stage the
4
Language in subjects' instructions where kept as neutral as possible and we explicitly
avoided terms as \piece rate" or \remuneration".
11
Alessandro Rossi and Massimo Warglien
A B
A (1 W=100) 120 (1 W=100)  80
B (1 W=100)  80 (1 W=100)  40
Figure 3: Principal's Payo conditional to piece rate W and agents' behav-
ior.
agents should defect (avoid helping eorts), since they face a standard
prisoner's dilemma game (whose payos are a linear transformation of the
production levels of Figure 1). As a result, the rst stage of the game
somehow recalls the structure of a dictator game, where the principal may
decide to retain the largest possible share of the pie. Hence, the unique
Nash equilibrium for the one shot game is for the principal to choose
W = 1 and for the two agents to play strategy B.
3.2 The experimental design
The experimental design is very simple, and consists in a two experiments
that were played sequentially by a population of 54 college undergraduates
recruited at the University of Trento (Italy) during July 1999 (30 of them
were undergraduates in Economics). Subjects were recruited through
announcements on bulletin boards in the Faculty of Economics and were
asked to show up at the Computable and Experimental Economic
Laboratory. The announcements claimed that subjects would have been
engaged in an experiment lasting about 1 hour and would have been able
to gain up to a maximum of 50000 Italian liras (approximately equal to 25
US dollars). During the experiment subjects earned experimental points
that were at the end converted in Italian liras at the rate of 15 Italian liras
per experimental point and were paid to the subjects in addition to a show
up fee of 10000 Italian liras (approximately equal to 5 US dollars). The
exchange rate was known in advance by all subjects. Their average nal
payo was of about 34000 Italian liras (approximately equal to 17 US
dollars) for subjects in the role of principals and of about 16000 Italian
liras (approximately equal to 8 US dollars) for subjects in the role of
agents, amounts which seemed more than sucient to motivate them
12
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during the experiment.
The subjects were randomly divided in groups of 3 subjects who remained
anonymously grouped during the entire experiment; the role of principal or
agent was also randomly assigned. Subsequently, subjects were seated in
front of computer terminals. After that an experimental administrator had
read the experiment instructions
5
and answered aloud to any question,
6
the experiment begun. Interaction between subjects were reduced to the
minimum during the experiment: each subject could see some two other
participants in the room but not their terminal monitors and verbal
communication was not allowed at all. Since one group could nish the
experiment earlier than the others, participants were asked to remain
quietly seated at their desk and to ll a payment form needed for the
payment of the experiment.
The experiment consisted in the repetition of 15 identical rounds of the
game presented in Section 3.1. The number of repetitions were considered
a reasonable length of time to allow learning to take place (if any was to
occur). Each round was thus organized:
 First stage. The subject in the role of the principal is asked to type a
number between 1 and 100, corresponding to the value to assign to
variable W ;
 Second stage. Each of the two subjects having the role of agent are
communicated the value of variable W and are asked to choose
between strategy A or B;
 End of round. each of the three subjects is given information on the
decision taken and the payo earned by all the participants of the
group.
At the end of the 15 rounds, subjects where told that they had to
participate to another experiment (experienced treatment), where groups
5
A translation from Italian of instructions is in Appendix A.
6
Each subject was revealed his/her role in the experiment, the principal role or the
agent role, only after all questions were answered, so that, in asking questions to the
administrator, subjects could not signal to other participants their role.
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were randomly reshued while everyone kept the role held in the previous
experiment (novice treatment).
The total payo of each subject at the end of the experiment was then
equal to the sum of the payos earned by the subject during the 30
rounds, plus the show up fee.
4 Experimental Results
Figure 4 shows the plot overtime of the average piece rate W and the
average joint production levels (q
1
+ q
2
) in each of the two treatments;
Table 1 presents some summary statistics on piece rates and on the
percentage of agents cooperating in each experimental session.
7
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics per session
novice treatment experienced treatment
session groups subjects av. W coop. rate av. W coop. rate
1 4 12 23.5 0.492 24.5 0.458
2 4 12 20.5 0.375 17.6 0.225
3 4 12 36.7 0.533 35.8 0.308
4 3 9 23.6 0.555 23.4 0.322
5 3 9 -
7
-
7
30.8 0.411
ALL 18 56 26.3 0.484 26.3 0.343
The equilibrium prediction is fullled in a relative low number of
observations (around 12% in the novice treatment and 20% in the
experienced treatment). The time series of piece rate do not show any
signicant trend towards the equilibrium in both treatments. Both
treatments presents also the same average piece rate value (W = 26:3).
The observed average of agents cooperating (the plot is not presented here,
but can be easily inferred from Figure 4, since the average rate of
7
It was not possible to report the results for session 5, novice treatment, because of a
bug in the experimental software that overwrote results of the experienced treatment in
the novice treatment logle.
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2 4 6 8 10 12 14
20
40
60
80
100
120
coop.
w
Figure 4: Average piece rate W and average production levels for the novice
and the experienced treatments.
Figure 5: Average cooperation rates in a 10-round prisoner' dilemma (part-
ners condition).
cooperation is a linear transformation of the average production levels)
appears to be constant overtime in the novice treatment and to show a
slightly decreasing trend in the experienced treatment. These graphical
inferences are conrmed by statistical tests: the decline in the cooperation
rate between the rst (56:6%) and the last (43:3%) period in the novice
treatment is not signicant, while the same dierence (from 55:5% to
30:5%) is signicant in the experienced treatment (randomization test,
 = 0:05). The average cooperation rates are, respectively, about 48% in
the novice treatment and about 34% in the experienced treatment.
Although it was not possible to test whether the dierence between the
two treatments was signicant, due to the lack of sucient independent
15
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observations, it is possible to compare this observed cooperation levels with
the experimental evidence on standard iterated prisoner's dilemma. Figure
5 reports the average cooperation rate in a 10{round prisoner's dilemma in
the experiment run by Andreoni and Miller [1993]. The dierence in
cooperation rates with respect to our experiment is evident: subjects in
the novice treatment show no convergence towards the equilibrium over
the 15 rounds, while in Andreoni and Miller [1993] the cooperation rate
converges close to zero in the 10 rounds. In the experienced treatment
subjects show a slight downward trend but still cooperation levels are
sensibly higher that in the standard prisoner's dilemma game.
As it is reasonable to expect, a close investigation of data reveals that the
experimental behavior of agents is heavily aected by the behavior of the
principal. In accordance with common sense, but contradicting equilibrium
predictions, the level of cooperation between agents responds to the
generosity of the principal. When the principal increases the piece rate,
agents do not decrease the joint production level in 84% (81%) of the
observations in the novice (experienced) treatment, and when the principal
decreases the piece rate, agents do not increase the joint production level in
the 82% (91%) of the observations in the novice (experienced) treatment.
This pattern of behavior may be viewed, in both novice and experienced
triples of players, in Figure 6. When the principal tends to choose values of
W near the equilibrium, agents coordinate on (B,B) in the majority of
observations. As the principal selects higher values of W , more pairs of
agents tend to coordinate on (A,A) (in this case, all three subjects are
better o than in equilibrium). Thus, principal's fairness matters and
aects the mutual relationships of agents. For values of W lesser than
65-75, there is a neat monotonic mapping from the piece rate W to the
output achieved. Notice, however, that for high levels of W the correlation
between piece rate and output breaks down. This eect may be not
signicant since there are very few observations in the right tail of the
histograms plotted in Figure 6 (W > 70 only in 8% (4%) of the
observations in the novice (experienced) treatment). Moreover, as the
history of individual sequences of runs reveals (see Figures 6-7), the
16
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Figure 6: Histogram plot of the frequency of productivity of agents corre-
sponding to dierent classes of piece rate W decided by the principal in the
novice and in the experienced treatment. Top, middle and bottom bars are
respectively related to the frequency of observations where both the agents
cooperate, one agent only cooperates and the other one defects, both agents
defect.
breakdown in some observation is maybe due to the fact that most
\ultrafair" piece rates have been oered by principals after a sequence of
highly unfair moves { which might impair their credibility.
Despite this \ultrafairness" bias, the overall link between agents'
performance and principals' fairness is signicant for both the novice and
expert populations of players: the Spearman rank order correlation
coecient is equal to r
s
= 21% for novices and equal to r
s
= 36% for
experts (both signicant at the  = 0:001 level). The increased rank order
correlation between the treatments is due to a large extent to the increased
frequency of (B,B) responses to low piece rates. Thus, it seems that
players have learned a strategy of coordinated reciprocation to the
principal unfair moves, and this may explain as well the descendent trend
in average production levels of the agents in the experienced treatment.
This suggests that the impact of fairness considerations is not a temporary
phenomenon, to be dissolved by a better understanding of the game
structure, but instead it is deeply connected to the way subjects
understand and interpret the game itself.
As a matter of fact, one may argue that the link between the level of the
piece rate W and cooperation rates could be explained in many other ways
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alternative to this interpretation in terms of coordinated reciprocal
behavior of the two agents against the principal. In particular, one may
suggest that the attitude of the agents to cooperate in a prisoner's
dilemma game may be aected by absolute size eects in the payo
structure, so that instances of the prisoner's dilemma game with the same
relative structure of the payos (same ratios) but with dierent absolute
values may be played dierently by experimental subjects. Put it in other
words, maybe the experimental outcomes of a prisoner's dilemma game are
not invariant to linear transformation of the payos.
Thus, we implemented as a control treatment a 2-person prisoner's
dilemma game with payos of random absolute size, in order to test the
existence of dierences on the agents' attitude to cooperate. Payos for
the two players of the game were, once again, the ones depicted in Fig. 2,
but this time a computerized device, rather than another experimental
subject (the principal), chose the value of W sampling at random from the
uniform distribution U  [1; 100].
8
The results of the control treatment are collected in Fig. 7. The
comparison of Fig. 7 with Fig. 6 clearly shows that, while the
experimental outcomes of a prisoner's dilemma game are not invariant to
linear transformation of the payos, the eects on cooperation rates of size
increases of agents' payos are opposite to the ones of fairness depicted in
the baseline treatment. As a matter of fact, the control treatment shows
that, as the magnitude of the payos increases, more and more agents
defect, while cooperation is a more frequent outcome when payos are
8
The experimental design closely followed the one described for the principal{two{agent
treatment, with the following dierences: 36 rst year undergraduate students (with no
previous knowledge of game theory) were recruited; subjects were divided in three cohorts
of 12 participants and then randomly matched in couples; only one experiment rather
than two were run, since we didn't want to test for the role of experience given the simpler
structure of the game; experimental points were converted at the rate of 40 Italian liras
per point, and subjects earned on average 22000 Italian liras (approximately equal to 11
US dollars) for an experiment lasting, on average, around 35 minutes. Each round of the
experiment run as follows: in the rst stage the computer program extracts the random
value of W and sends it to the two agents, in the second stage each of the two agents play
a prisoner's dilemma game with the payo collected in Fig. 2.
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Figure 7: Histogram plot of the frequency of cooperation of agents corre-
sponding to dierent classes of the random scale value W in the control
treatment. Top, middle and bottom bars are respectively related to the
frequency of observations where both the agents cooperate, one agent only
cooperates and the other one defects, both agents defect.
smaller. In other words, the analysis of single play sequences (not showed
here) suggests that many agents seems during the rounds of the
experiment to signal cooperation when the payos of the game are smaller
and to exploit the other agent through defection when the payos are
higher.
9
Overall, the comparison of the results of the control treatment to
the ones of the baseline treatment conrm us that in the baseline
treatment the two agents reacts to the attitude of the principal to share
the outcome of the game, performing coordinated action of reciprocal
behavior to sanction (recompense) unfair (fair) oer to share the pie.
While the broad facts seem quite clear, understanding how principals'
fairness aects relationships between agents deserves some caution.
Simplifying a bit things, reciprocity has two faces, one positive and the
other negative [Rabin, 1993]: I may be willing to sacrice my own material
well-being to help the kind other or I may be willing to sacrice my own
material well{being to punish the unkind other. In dyadic relationships,
these two faces can be easily distinguished. This may not be the case with
9
This result seems to be particular robust and interesting if one takes into account
that the relative structure of the payos of Fig. 2 is such that the gain from defection is
relatively small compared to the gain from mutual cooperation.
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Figure 8: Piece rates and joint production levels series for each group, novice
treatment.
triangular relationships. In particular, our experiment clearly shows that
fair principals tend to generate positive reciprocity between pairs of agents
{ they act in each other's favor, as well as in favor of the principal, and
show higher and more persistent cooperation rates than in a conventional
prisoners' dilemma. On the other hand, interpreting how principals'
unfairness aects relationships between agents is much harder. The
experimental data suggest that unfair principals induce less cooperation
between agents than the one usually observed in prisoners' dilemmas. But
is this due to the fact that greedy principals generate greedy agents, or to
the fact that agents unite their purposes in retaliating the principal? In
other words, does hierarchical unfairness induce unkindness or mutualism
between agents? Unfortunately, the structure of the game doesn't help
much in directly discriminating between these two hypotheses. By deciding
to produce B, an agent hurts the principal but at the same time does
makes the other agent worse o. There is no way to infer an agent's
intention from a single move.
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Figure 9: Piece rates and joint production levels series for each group, ex-
perienced treatment.
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Figure 10: Relative frequencies of piece rate W and average payo for a
principal (downward data plot) and an agent (upward data plot) in the
novice and in the experienced treatment.
Nevertheless, it is reasonable to argue that prompt shifts from (B;B) to
(A;A) as principals increase piece rates may witness the existence of
positive reciprocity (mutual help) between agents. A closer analysis of
single play sequences (Figures 8{9) reveals that there are many such
examples. In particular, in the experienced treatment, almost all instances
of (A;A) emerging after mutual defection are responses to increases in
piece rates, and some single play sequences show neat examples of well
coordinated series of retaliation and reward by both agents (an almost
perfect example is 2
nd
group { S3 in the experienced treatment). However,
the reverse doesn't always hold, and often increases in piece rates fail to
elicit cooperation between agents. It isn't clear whether these
counterexamples are due to mistrust against the principal or self{interest:
thus the indirect evidence from single play sequences is only partially
supportive of positive reciprocity between agents, and probably more
accurate experimental design is needed to better discriminate between the
two types of agents' reciprocity.
Another interesting problem is explaining the persisting high level of
unfairness of principals (see Figure 10). If for example one takes as a
benchmark usual laboratory behavior in bargaining games [Roth, 1995], the
behavior of principals in our experiment seems unusually greedy. In about
50% of cases, principals take as much as possible. Actually, our principals'
behavior bears more resemblance to that of players of a dictator game. In
part, this may be explained by the persistence of some miscoordination in
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agents' responses, that makes unfairness paying o on average. Given the
observed distribution of agents' responses, taking as much as possible is
still the best move for principals even in the experienced treatment (Figure
10). Although experienced agents succeed in reducing the steepness of the
principals' average payo curve, the level of coordinated retaliation by
agents is not enough to transform such curve in a parable (even in the case
of minimal piece rates, there is still a 30% of eveniences in which at least
one agent plays A) . We also suspect that, as the number of other players
increases, considerations of unilateral fairness (pure altruism) may dilute.
5 Discussion and further research
While we think that our experiment convincingly demonstrates that
vertical and horizontal fairness interact in hierarchical triangles, much
needs to be done to better understand the nature of such interaction. As
we have already seen, in our experiment it is hard to discriminate between
two dierent eects of principals' unfairness: negative versus positive
reciprocity between agents. More accurate experimental design might be
devised to separate those two eects. Furthermore, we think that less
symmetric situations are useful to explore. For example, the principal
might be able to dierentiate agents' rewards, introducing asymmetries in
incentives; asymmetries in agents' capabilities are case of interest as well.
Also, the eects of information asymmetries deserve further investigation:
fairness considerations may be signicantly aected by dierent
distributions of information among players.
Finally, we claim that our experiment suggests more prudence in the use of
standard game{theoretic concepts in organization theory. While the use of
non{cooperative games as a tool for modeling organizational phenomena
has become widespread (and the prisoner's dilemma is especially abused!),
little or no attention has been accorded to how behavior in such games
may change when they are immersed in a hierarchical context. Our
experiment shows that even when equilibria do not change, the hierarchical
context may deeply aect actual agents' strategies. We think that much
23
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useful understanding might be gained by systematically exploring how
well{known games are played in hierarchical contexts.
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A Experimental Instructions
A.1 Introduction
You are participating to an economic experiment. You are kindly asked to
carefully read the instructions. Then you will be able to ask questions that
will be openly answered. This experiment will last about one hour. If you
follow the instructions closely and make decisions carefully, you can earn a
considerable amount of money. During the experiment you can earn
experimental points that at the end of the experiment will be converted
into Italian liras (1 experimental point = 15 Italian liras) and will be
added to the xed amount of 10000 Italian lira. This will be your
monetary payment for participating in the experiment.
A.2 Instructions
During the whole experiment you are anonymously matched with other
two players in this room. One of the players is called player 1 (from now
on, P
1
) and the other two players are called player 2 and player 3 (P
2
and
P
3
). Matching will be performed at random by the computer program at
the beginning of the experiment and will not revealed. Your identity
during the experiment (P
1
, P
2
or P
3
) will be revealed after reading the
instructions and after that all questions will have been answered.
The experiment involves the repetition for 15 times (rounds) of two stages,
that will be described in a moment. At the end of each round, payos will
be announced and then the next round will start. Your nal payo will be
equal to the sum of payos earned in each of the rounds, plus the xed
payment of 10000 Italian lira.
Each round runs as follows:
First phase
Player P
1
decides and sends to players P
2
and P
3
the value to be assigned
to W . W is a percentage number that can be chosen among all integer
numbers between 1(%) and 100(%).
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Second phase
Players P
2
and P
3
decide, independently and simultaneously, whether to
undertake action A or action B.
End of round
The experimental software computes the quantities Q
2
and Q
3
, produced
by players P
2
e P
3
, on the basis of their choices during the second phase
according to the following table:
P
3
's action
P
2
's action
A B
A Q
2
= 60; Q
3
= 60 Q
2
= 10; Q
3
= 70
B Q
2
= 70; Q
3
= 10 Q
2
= 20; Q
3
= 20
Finally, the experimental software computes and sends to everyone the
payo earned by each player. Payos are computed according to the
following formulas:
P
1
's Payo = (100  W )(Q
2
+Q
3
) ;
P
2
's Payo =WQ
2
;
P
3
's Payo =WQ
3
.
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